



# Humanitarianism in the aftermath of sans-frontierisme

Written by David Sontag Rieff

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# **Humanitarianism in the aftermath of sans-frontierisme**

A specter is haunting '*Sans-Frontierisme*', the specter of borders. [With apologies to Marx], this much is self-evident.

What is less clear is how much the rebirth of so many assertive strong states in the poor world<sup>1</sup> and the simultaneous re-emphasis by the major Western donor governments, above all the United States, on the inseparability of relief aid from these governments' broader foreign policy aims in general, and, in the Islamic world in particular, war aims. This emphatically does *not* mean that these developments signal the 'death' of humanitarian action because it is no longer possible to act effectively while remaining faithful to the basic operational and moral minima that have been the bedrock of modern humanitarianism, and without which no serious efforts can be undertaken responsibly. What it does mean, though – and this is grave enough without apocalyptic exaggeration – is that if humanitarian action is to continue to be effective, it must work through how both to adapt and decline to adapt to this radically altered political context.

What has changed? First and foremost, it is the realization has finally sunk in that one of the primary assumptions on which relief work has been predicated, and which has provided it with much of its internal coherence – the assumption that relief organizations will be free to decide what places they want to work and according what criteria – applies in fewer and fewer places where NGOs are either now working or are likely to want to work. To be sure, the extent of this freedom of action has tended to be exaggerated (though nowhere near the extent of the largely unfounded assumption that relief agencies do better work when they are not dependent on government donor). Borders were never the non-issue of humanitarian myth, and Cambodia in the 70s offers a paradigmatic example of a program where relief workers could only operate in the refugee camps on the Thai side of the border. Nonetheless, the humanitarian *ideal* almost from the

‘reinvention’ of humanitarian action by MSF in the early 1970s was of a world in which frontiers would not be an impediment – an ideal that came to at least seem like reality between the aftermath of 1989 and the aftermath of 9/11.

Christopher Stokes of MSF/Belgium has argued that this ‘moment’ was less an autochthonous development within the humanitarian world as much as it was a reflection of post-Cold War euphoria that produced such (in retrospect) preposterously utopian expressions as Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s ‘An Agenda for Peace’ and George Herbert Walker Bush’s speeches on a New World Order – both of which presumed that borders would simply no longer be the impediment to multilateral peacekeeping, development, and caritative that they had always been in the past. Stokes is certainly right to underscore the extent to which ideological trends within humanitarianism have always reflected larger ideological trends outside it. Rony Brauman’s analysis of 1970s and early-80s humanitarianism as to some extent a ‘Cold War humanitarianism’ led by people – including himself at the time – whose world view was anti-totalitarian, equating Communism with Nazism offers a powerful demonstration of this. [<http://Grotius.fr/node/397>] Another example would be the extent to which the development of the doctrine of the *droit d’ingerence* in the late-1980s came to influence (and still profoundly influences) the thinking of many mainstream humanitarian agencies, notably Oxfam, as well as having informed much UN thinking, at least during the secretary generalship of Kofi Annan, as evidenced by the efforts the Secretary-General fostered that led eventually to the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

As Brauman has reminded us, it is vital not to impute to the position major relief associations like MSF and Oxfam held in a given period views and analyses that only came to inform their approach much later – for example, writing as if the *droit d’ingerence* was part of humanitarian thinking in the 1970s, fifteen years before it was elaborated. At the same time, it can surely be argued without violence to the historical record that from the beginning the ethos of *Sans Frontierisme* – that is, the way the ideal of what humanitarian action should permit was conceptualized – was grounded in the belief that the decision to start a relief operation should be based on need *as understood by the relief agencies*. The point is crucial, and, in my view, inscribed on the DNA of the humanitarian movement. Its corollary – that states which refused to allow relief agencies access or set onerous conditions on their work were guilty in moral terms

and should be held accountable in legal ones as well – was if anything more important still to the doctrine of *Sans Frontierisme*. In this sense, at least, the line is a fairly straight one from Biafra, with its *de facto* support for the Ibo revolt (however much it was manipulated by certain Great Powers) to R2P’s\* comprehensive challenge to the Westphalian system.

Take, for example, MSF’s famous 1980s publicity slogan ‘We have two billion people in our waiting room.’ Much has been made since – especially within MSF, where the memory of the campaign is still cause for some embarrassment – of the hubristic quality of this claim. But in terms of *Sans Frontierisme* surely the more salient element was the use of the possessive pronoun. ‘Our’ waiting room? What this evokes, intentionally or unintentionally, is not just extra-territoriality but a ‘humanitarian space’ – MSF’s global emergency clinic – from which *all* national boundaries have been erased. It is the difference between a terrain map and a political map. To criticize the ad is hardly challenging. What is more relevant is to ask whether the humanitarian movement would have been able to capture the imagination of its donors and its volunteers without the presumption that aid workers should (even if it was not always possible) be able to deploy wherever there was the need for them.

But this implied one of three things:

- a) the international political equivalent of the Biblical utopia of swords being beaten into plough shares – that is, all governments becoming responsible and responsive to their people’s needs;
- b) a global regime of intervention – diplomatic for preference, military as a last resort – that would force abusive regimes to mend their ways and, at a minimum, give the relief workers access and respect ‘humanitarian space’ (R2P embodies this approach);
- or c) the continuation into the 21<sup>st</sup> century of the situation of the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> in which states were so weak that, with notable exceptions, obviously, relief groups could deploy wherever they thought the need made their action vital, operate largely according to their own norms and (self-imposed) codes of conduct and, in the case of medical agencies, professional deontology, and withdraw as they saw fit – that is, on their own terms, whatever the wishes of the authorities of the states in question.

\* R2P: *Responsibility to protect*



This attitude was so engrained in the collective imagination of the relief NGOs – the humanitarian international, as Alex De Waal once called it – that it was if they had been collectively struck by lightning when, in 1995, the RPF government of General Paul Kagame decreed that while relief NGOs were at liberty to use and indeed to have ownership of their vehicles as long as they remained in Rwanda (the vehicles had been brought into the country either from other parts of the region or in some cases much further off), when the NGOs left the country these vehicles would become the property of the Rwandan state. What had been a sort of *de facto* self-awarding of extra-territoriality – as if these private voluntary organizations really did enjoy the same status as the ICRC (whose right to withdraw *with* the equipment they had brought into Rwanda the Kagame regime did not challenge) – had been stripped away. And in one form or another, the last fifteen years have seen more and more states following this Rwandan ‘model.’

The effect of this ‘new normal’ – as they say on Wall Street these days – on program has been far more serious than the effect on logistical inventory. Strong states view NGOs as either carrying out programs that are helpful to them or as expendable. And what states have understood is that NGOs are so oriented toward *remaining* operational that imposing more and more restrictions, above all in terms of access, will only rarely lead to withdrawal. Indeed, in recent years in the Ogaden, the Ethiopian government has used the NGOs almost like reconstruction contractors – expelling them when the army was conducting cordon and search anti-guerrilla operations, only to let them back in after these operations were complete. Medical NGOs in particular can find themselves prisoners of their own professional deontology, in much the way doctors and nurses in slum hospitals in the West do not resign even when they know that the conditions that cause most of their patients to present themselves are getting worse, not better. If your ethical idea is, as the ICRC’s Philippe Gaillard once put, ‘to bring a measure of humanity, always insufficient, into situations that should not exist,’ then withdrawal is an awfully difficult decision to take – and rightly so<sup>2</sup>.

It is in no small measure because of this dilemma that so many relief organizations have been drawn toward a rights-based approach to their work, despite the obvious fact that humanitarian work is based on compromises with – to borrow the structure of Gaillard’s formulation – regimes and insurgent movements that should not

exist, whereas human rights work is based on the absolutism of the law (law is absolutist or it is nothing). The human rights worker does not need to be on the ground; the aid worker does. The human rights activist must be a purist, whereas if a relief worker takes such a stance, his or her effectiveness, at least in the short and medium term (the 'no peace without justice' argument is a separate, and highly dubious historically in my view, but even if one accepts it, it is at best a very long term proposition).

The problem is hardly new. But the rebirth of the strong state makes it far more acute. It is, for example, increasingly common for states to monitor not only the published reports of aid agencies, but also the comments they post on their websites. In a recent incident, the Sri Lankan authorities read remarks critical of the role of the Ministry of Health in caring for the more than 200,000 Tamils interned in the aftermath of the crushing of the Tiger Eelam rebellion that appeared on MSF/Holland's website (and nowhere else). The government demanded that MSF retract its criticisms if it wished to go on working in the north of Sri Lanka. And while MSF was able to negotiate to a certain extent on the phrasing, the decision was made to bow to the demand.

I am by no means sure that MSF/Holland was wrong to behave as it did. To the contrary, there is a case to be made that it was the speaking out that was the superfluous gesture under the circumstances (Sri Lanka being a paradigmatic example of the resurgent strong state). Rony Brauman has identified and criticized a certain tropism in the relief world toward what he has called 'humanitarian noise.' It is true, as he knows better than anyone, that making this 'noise' was a useful tactic at one point. But in the context in which relief work now operates, is it really essential for humanitarian NGOs to be constantly going on the record. It would be one thing if an NGO was really lobbying for a military intervention (as in my view MSF did in Kosovo while denying, perhaps even to itself, that it was doing so). But no one ever thought there could be an intervention in Sri Lanka. So what *was* the purpose of talking?

One answer is that MSF in particular is committed to *temoignage*. But even in the case of such a foundational bit of institutional doctrine, the question needs to be asked: Why? When *temoignage* did not run the risk of being the quickest route to expulsion, there was no reason to question it and much to recommend it. But now? And of course, it is not only that states will seize on reports they do not like as a pretext

for expelling relief groups. The problem is severely aggravated by the recent use of MSF rape reports by the International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, as part of the basis of his indictment of General Bashir, the Sudanese president. Faced with expulsion on this basis, MSF repeatedly asserted its neutrality and pointed to its adoption "since the creation of the ICC" of a "binding internal policy refraining from any cooperation with the ICC... based on the recognition that humanitarian activities must remain independent from [the] risk of political and judicial pressure in order to give medical and relief assistance to populations in situations of trouble and violence." [<http://doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=2868&cat=open-letters>]

The problem is that Moreno Ocampo did not need MSF's *active* cooperation. All he needed were documents it had previously made public. Moreover, perhaps not realizing how drastically the situation on the ground had changed, MSF had supported the ICC statute and indeed called for a court that would "accord to the victims and to witnesses [of crimes] guarantees of independent and effective justice." [memo the Rome Treaty negotiators issued by MSF in June, 1998] Be careful what you wish for. And the more effective a weapon the ICC becomes in various peace negotiations (and in some places – Kenya, for example – there is evidence that it is), the less reason states will have to allow relief groups to stay in conflict zones because of the use their reports will likely be put to in judicial procedures.

And if states have gotten stronger, so have insurgencies. Fabrice Weissman's remark that in certain war zones – above all, where the war between NATO and the Jihadists is in full swing – MSF's task is to persuade the Jihadis that relief workers will be worth more to them alive and carrying out their programs than they are dead is telling not only because of the harsh truth it well describes but because this development is genuinely new. Whether one attributes this to the disappearance of a certain penumbral after effect of colonialism that seemed for a time to confer immunity on aid workers, or the civilizational barbarization that has accompanied the rise of the Jihadist international and the Western response to it in which, neither side accepting neutrality, everyone must choose and no one is a civilian, or the profit motive pure and simple (it is probably a bit of all three of these), humanitarian independence becomes simultaneously more valuable and more unattainable. To ask people being bombed by NATO and terrorized by Jihadis to keep in mind that, say, MSF is a European organization but is not a belligerent is a

tall order. This is not to say that it can never be done, only that it is unbelievably difficult. And MSF deludes itself if it imagines that there can be several humanitarian system, or even that it can somehow opt out of the one global system there is.

On the donor side, the change is so blatant as to be barely worth detailing. Since the days of Trinquier in Algeria or Lansdale in Vietnam, intelligently conducted counter-insurgency warfare has been based on combining extraordinary violence with rural development with a strong emphasis on infrastructure, water and sanitation, and medical aid – in other words, precisely the strong suit of relief NGOs. There is no question of permitting the humanitarian system *as a whole* to opt out of this project, and MSF and other groups that abstain from participating a) will not be able to do so with complete consistency (the use of military logistics in natural disasters is an obvious example), and b) will find it difficult to distinguish themselves effectively from other NGOs – with whom they will certainly collaborate in other contexts – that do participate.

There is certainly no shortage of possible responses, great and small. Although there has been a certain amount of denial – what might be called the ‘King Canute Syndrome’ in which relief workers simply go on insisting that somehow these changes must not be acknowledged or accommodated in any way, as if the NGO’s could make them go away by denying their legitimacy, perennity, or morality – it is to the credit of many relief agencies that they have been more willing to grasp the nettle than, for example, the mainline human rights organizations have been willing to do. The most hard-headed and plausible responses that are more than just cosmetic re-jiggerings of the status quo are as follows:

A) ‘If you can’t beat them, join them (but try to sway them once you’re ‘inside’).’ This stance, long assumed by some of the most important American relief ngos like the International Rescue Committee, assumes that the donors will always control the humanitarian system (and that – contra the argument routinely heard within some European relief groups, notably msf – there is only one humanitarian system from which opting-out is wishful thinking – often self-serving wishful thinking). The irc’s view, as it has evolved, is that the whip hand donors hold is not absolute and that history has proved that ngos have been effective behind the scenes lobbyists – that they have not by any means simply

been instruments of Washington’s policies but have been able to influence it substantially. Although it views itself as far more oppositional, and through its chain of shops has an important independent source of revenue, in practical terms Oxfam UK has followed much the same line with regard to Her Majesty’s government, at least since Labour returned to power in 1997<sup>3</sup>.

- B) Further imbricate humanitarian action in the context of international law and human rights activism. This view, upheld by groups as different as CARE/International (which in one internal paper a few years ago *defined itself* as a human rights organization), Oxfam, and MSF/Holland, proceeds from the premise that, as the former head of UNHCR, Sadako Ogata, famously put it, “there are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems.” On this account, there is simply no way that relief NGOs can get away from a protection (in the international law sense) mandate, but that, once they have assumed one, human rights work becomes an essential part of their task – no matter how difficult this may make their operations on the ground.
- C) ‘Re-politicize’ humanitarian action, drawing it closer to the anti-globalization movement. This view has been well-expressed by the French humanitarian specialist, Christian Toube, who has written that “humanitarianism knew how to internationalize itself, [now, it must] globalize itself.” Toube is arguing against what he calls *l’humanitaire de projection* – a military term whose closest English equivalent would probably be ‘expeditionary humanitarianism’ – instead favoring a humanitarian movement that has de-Europeanized itself both in terms of its cadres and its culture.
- D) Challenge the idea that there is only one humanitarian system and that even without the international legal mandate that is at the root of the legitimacy of the International Committee of the Red Cross, at least some relief NGOs can successfully stand, as the ICRC has long done, at a certain remove from the donor-driven, UN special agency dominated mainstream of the relief world. This idea is both most strongly upheld within MSF, above all, MSF/France – in any case, a medical NGO has a self-sufficient and coherent deontology that ‘all-purpose’ NGOs, no matter how many codes of conduct they sign up to or ‘best practices’ to which they commit themselves cannot – and most associated with MSF in a negative way by other mainstream relief NGOs.

Unsurprisingly, there are difficulties with all these approaches. But the alternative of more or less standing pat is hardly preferable. Stasis is bound to be both demoralizing and corrosive. Is it really an unhappy coincidence that three of the five operational centers have gone through leadership crises over the course of the past two years? Yes, in each case there were particular factors that led to what occurred, and yes, MSF has had a number of leadership crises in the past. Compared with the rupture that occurred when Bernard Kouchner lost his bid to set the terms of reference for MSF's actions and left the association, the more recent power struggles are far less significant. The recent conflicts have been more about personality than deontology. But one scarcely needs to be the second coming of Max Weber to understand that it is often at moments when the deontology is no longer as intelligible as it formerly was that personality-driven disputes tend to come to the fore.

It is tempting to be nostalgic about the way humanitarian action used to be practiced. And yet, nostalgia is almost always a prophylactic against thought. This is made worse by the fact that the icons of this form of reminiscence are themselves largely metaphoric. Take the discussion of 'humanitarian space.' The most cursory reflection should show that there is no such acreage. Nor is there any strong legal case to be made – as there is with the ICRC – for asserting special NGO rights, or at least privileges, on the ground. In any case, the rhetoric of the humanitarian preserve, echoing as it eerily does the rhetoric of private property rights on the one hand and ambassadorial extra-territoriality on the other, is itself increasingly a dead end.

The solutions are anything but obvious. One of the most interesting arguments that has been made – as far as I know, Christian Toubé has made it most strongly [<http://www.grotius.fr/node/308>] – is that humanitarianism must 'reappropriate' political space. What he has in mind is what he calls the 'globalization' of humanitarian aid. But there are real difficulties with this. When Toubé postulates a globalized humanitarianism of Beninois, Malians, etc., he is evoking a virtuous de-Westernization. But that itself is a Western progressive conceit. Unmentioned here is the fact that these Beninois, Malians, etc. will have interests, political commitments, allegiances that trump (necessarily) far narrow humanitarian principle – above all neutrality. Think of the degree of political partisanship that various national sections of major relief groups showed during the Kosovo intervention – the Greek section of MSF with the Serbs, for example,

while other sections of the movement, while not coming out and calling for intervention, issued reports with demands for access whose implementation required intervention.

The history of politicization, even solely within a Euro-American context has not exactly been brilliant. You cannot, as Toubé does, call for the transcendence of the Judaeo-Christian assumptions of the aid world, and simultaneously imagine that specifically Western notions of impartiality will make sense to a humanitarian international that is truly globalized – anymore than Western notions of press freedom to the extent that they privilege the precedence of the rights of the individual over the interests of the group are as self-evident in Asia or Africa or the Middle East as they are in Europe, North and South America, and India. And the Achilles Heel of many humanitarian operation has been the failure of expat staff to fully assimilate the degree to which the political loyalties of local staff at times can trump their commitment to humanitarian principles. Are there difficulties with an 'expeditionary' approach? Of course there are, and Toubé is right to emphasize them. But the ICRC is expeditionary, and it is hard to see how it could be effective in any other way. Obviously, globalizing personnel is by definition a good thing. But the advantage of a globalized, that is *anti-expeditionary* approach to humanitarian action is anything but as self-evident operationally as Toubé apparently assumes.

In any case, humanitarianism as a contributor to war efforts great and small hardly began with Colin Powell's famous 'force multiplier' speech to US NGOs just before the launching of the American war in Afghanistan. And even keeping the focus on Afghanistan alone, MSF's efforts during the 'Russian war' can certainly be understood as pro-Mujahedeen. There are many other cautionary tales, by no means all of them connected to support for Western interests. Take, for example, relief efforts in Palestine. It is scarcely surprising many mainstream European relief agencies are under pressure from their own staff to run programs in Palestine since the Palestinian cause is the great cause of middle-class young people in Europe. The fact that by and large, these programs are largely ineffective has not caused them to be closed: such is the effect of politicization. The logic of Toubé's argument is closer to that of a solidarity organization which does humanitarian work than to a relief NGO as we now usually understand them. And such organizations have long existed. Think of Norwegian People's Aid in South Sudan, whose ads in Norwegian newspapers stated honestly, 'we're not neutral, we support the SPLA.'

In addition to groups like NPA, important Islamic and even Islamist donors and relief groups have come into being over the course of the past decade for which the idea of neutrality and even impartiality are viewed very differently than they are by major Western secular relief NGOs<sup>4</sup>. And the humanitarian international is going to have to coexist with them – donors and implementers alike – just as it has had to learn to navigate in a world in which development policy in large measure but also emergency relief to a considerable degree are being formulated by newly powerful private philanthropies, first and foremost the Gates Foundation. If nothing else, the nomination of Rajiv Shah, formerly deputy director of the Gates Global Health Initiative and then head of its 3 billion dollar agriculture program, to become the administrator of USAID should convince anyone in doubt about where power lies in the development world.

The great American poet, Wallace Stevens, once remarked that sentimentality was a failure of feeling. For far too long, the humanitarian movement – or at least far too great a proportion of it – has sentimentalized itself, in the process – as Rony Brauman has explained in some detail in his reply to a recent piece by Toubé. But valuable, indeed essential, as de-sentimentalizing unquestionably is (at times, it can seem as if what is really needed is de-sacralization), it is only the first step in thinking through the present and future of humanitarian action. At least as important is the acceptance of the facts: the strong state is back for the foreseeable future while the instrumentalization of relief to serve the foreign policy aims of major donor governments is likely to be equally enduring. Anyone doubting this need only look at the recent decision of the Obama administration to make USAID part of the State Department at precisely the time when the collaboration between State and the US Department of Defense is gathering momentum.

I am not a practitioner and have far more confidence in my analysis than any prescriptions I could possibly offer. Having registered that *caveat*, it does seem to me that the avenues being explored by Jean-Herve Bradol and Morton Roestrop within MSF are far more promising than suggestions that relief work needs to be merged further with human rights work or that it needs to become more overtly political in the anti-globalization movement sense, or, for that matter in the campaigning mode of Oxfam which now seems far more focused on its policy recommendations and campaigning than on what it was renowned for twenty years ago – water and sanitation. In somewhat different ways, Bradol and Roestrop want to restore as

the primary basis MSF's legitimacy in the field and in dealing with governments, the UN system, and other NGOs on both the efficacy and capacity for medical innovation of the organization in the field.

Rather like the GMO debate (and perhaps just as unfortunately), in an important sense prolonging the debate about independent humanitarianism, etc., is a waste of time. GMO crops are going to become more and more common and independent humanitarianism. China has seen to that. By the same token, caught between the Scylla of donor priorities and the Charybdis of the return of the strong state in the poor world, truly independent humanitarian action is going to become less and less feasible – at least in many of the places NGOs of conscience and ability are going to feel the need to work. In fairness, it is by no means clear, in terms of pure medical efficacy, whether NGO independence is really important *operationally* as its advocates are wont to suggest. The same can be said about the debate over humanitarian independence.

That argument assumes that **a)** there is overwhelming evidence that independent humanitarian action generally achieves better results on the ground; predictably, the historical record is mixed, and **b)** that there is agreement about what the object is of the sentence that begins with 'humanitarian independence' as its subject.

The end of one version of *Sans Frontierisme*, however significant it has been historically, should probably be cause for regret. But what it emphatically does not mean is the death of the humanitarian enterprise – at least if that is understood as fundamentally caritative, rather than fundamentally a flag of convenience for an ambitious political project, whether that is Bernard Kouchner's, Attac's, or Barack Obama's. To the contrary, the chance that ideology will play a smaller role in the future and medical expertise a large one may well prove to be the best thing that has happened to 'non-conformist' NGOs like MSF in a long time, even if the proximate causes – the return of frontiers, the priorities of the long war and the long jihad, and the hegemonic philanthropy of Gates and Clinton – are anything but happy events.

# Notes

<sup>1</sup> I have used the expressions ‘poor world’ and ‘rich world’ not because they are in themselves satisfactory as terms – they are anything but that – but because they seem to me at least superior to ‘Global South’ and ‘Global North,’ which are far too metaphoric, particularly in the age of the BRIC countries, and thus, to me at least, high questionable, let alone to the far more tendentious ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ world, which assumes development as a species of historical inevitability and thus is exemplifies a [secularized] Christian progress narrative than being defensible as globally accurate descriptive terms.

<sup>2</sup> MSF’s withdrawal from North Korea is one of the few clear-cut recent examples of a relief NGO withdrawing rather than being forced out (as in Darfur, Niger, etc.).

<sup>3</sup> If anything, the ‘interlocking directorate’ element joining Oxfam and the Blair and then the Brown governments in terms of bureaucratic posts with responsibility for relief and development questions has been far more pronounced than any connection between mainline US NGOs and Washington.

<sup>4</sup> See the excellent Humanitarian Policy Group Paper, “Diversity in Donorship: The Changing Landscape of Official Humanitarian Aid,” which explores this and the broader question of non-DAC donorship with great sophistication.



**MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES**  
**MEDICI SENZA FRONTIERE**

Premio Nobel per la Pace 1999

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During the nineteen-nineties, he covered conflicts in Africa (Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Liberia), the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo), and Central Asia. Now a contributing writer for the New York Times Magazine, he has written extensively about Iraq, and, more recently, about Latin America. He is the author of eight books, including *Slaughterhouse Bosnia and the Failure of the West* and *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*". His memoir of his mother's final illness, *Swimming in a Sea of Death*, appeared last January.

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